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A RECENT CARD analysis looked at the implications of a potential EU-
US Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) for bioenergy 
and associated feedstock markets. 
This article reports on the effects of 
removing bilateral tariffs and TRQs in 
the two bio-economies. An extensive 
report is available on the CARD website. 
Notable policy distortions
Policies in US and EU agricultural 
markets are less distorting than in the 
past, especially for grain and oilseed 
markets. Signiϐicant distortions remain 
in US sugar markets, however, as US 
sugar policy uses trade distortions 
(TRQ and associated high tariffs) to 
support prices. Domestic price levels 
historically have been two-to-three 
times the level of world prices. The 
out-of-quota tariff is 15.36c/lb raw 
sugar and 16.21c/lb for reϐined sugar. 
Free imports come from Mexico under 
NAFTA but are limited by the low 
competiveness of the Mexican sugar 
industry and by some rules of origin 
and side agreements. The US sugar 
lobby has been effective at limiting 
the inϐlux of sugar imports under 
other agreements such as CAFTA, and 
the bilateral Australia-US agreement. 
Sugar policy in the European Union 
is in transition, as sugar production 
quotas will end in 2017—a major 
change for that sector. Since 2006, the 
EU sugar sector has been rationalized 
and quotas ensure high guaranteed 
prices. However, despite protections, EU 
sugar production is more competitive 
than its US counterpart. Under a TTIP, 
high prices in the US market would 
induce EU exports to the US market. 
Isoglucose (sugar made from grains 
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like HFCS) faces a duty of €507/MT of 
net weight. The United States faces this 
high tariff on its potential exports of 
HFCS. With bilateral liberalization, US 
HFCS would be competitive for use in 
EU food processing. Despite high sugar 
prices, the EU soft drink industry has 
not shifted to isoglucose to abate high 
sugar cost, in contrast to the US soft 
drink industry, which uses HFCS. This 
is due in part to EU isoglucose being 
constrained by production quotas to 
protect the EU sugar industry. These 
quotas will also be dismantled in 2017.
In biofuel markets, major 
distortions remain through mandates 
in both countries and through trade 
restrictions in the European Union. 
Border protection of ethanol in 
the European Union depends on 
preferential agreements and the 
statistical classiϐication of ethanol-
related products. Numerous fuel 
blends are imported under different 
classiϐications. The MFN tariff on 
ethanol for fuel is €19.20/hl for 
undenatured ethanol, and €10.20/hl for 
denatured ethanol. Currently, the United 
States faces antidumping duties that 
will expire by 2018, outside the 2022 
horizon of our analysis, hence we do not 
consider them. 
Removing bilateral tariffs and TRQs
Table 1 (available at http://www.card.
iastate.edu/ag_policy_review/ ) shows 
supply changes (production, aggregate 
imports), changes in use (feed, food, 
industrial, aggregate exports),  and 
price changes. For each variable, the 
percent change is shown along with the 
2022 baseline level. The liberalization 
of trade between the European Union 
and the United States has a large impact 
on ethanol markets. In the European 
Union, ethanol price falls by 15 percent 
and there is a massive increase in 
imports (from the United States) and a 
substantial fall in ethanol output as well 
for DDGs. In the United States, production 
For biofuel use, raw sugar beets are processed to obtain reﬁ ned sugar, which is then 
converted to ethanol. (Photo by Peggy Greb)
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is stimulated and exports more 
than double (121 percent increase) 
stimulated by the EU trade opening and 
higher prices. Exports of DDGs expand 
by 40 percent and its price falls because 
of the near ϐixity between ethanol and 
DDGs. Feedstock use in each region 
experiences associated changes. 
In the European Union, feedstock 
use (coarse grains and wheat in 
industrial use) and associated 
imports fall along with the price of 
coarse grains; lower DDG output is 
compensated by larger DDG imports. 
In the United States, the reverse occurs, 
with an expansion of coarse grains used 
in industrial use (ethanol), a reduction 
of coarse grain exports, and a small 
increase in coarse grain production 
responding to higher corn prices.
Changes in the bio-diesel markets 
echo the changes in the ethanol 
markets. EU biodiesel production 
contracts by three percent and 
imports expand by 23 percent. In the 
United States, biodiesel expands by 
19 percent and exports more than 
double to the European Union. The 
vegetable oil and oilseed use follow 
these changes in biodiesel markets. In 
the European Union, industrial use of 
oils contracts by nearly four percent, 
oil and meal production contract by 
two percent and so does the volume 
of oilseeds crushed. Meal imports 
from the United States make up for 
the reduced domestic availability of 
EU meal. US oil and meal production 
expands by roughly 13 percent with 
more oilseeds being crushed (a 15 
percent increase in industrial use) and 
fewer oilseeds being exported (an 18 
percent reduction). Given the small 
changes in relative prices for grains and 
oilseeds, the changes in production for 
these commodities are small in both 
countries.
Changes in sweetener markets are 
the third important set of results in the 
simulations. Sugar trade liberalization 
between the European Union and 
the United States induces a massive 
contraction of both raw and reϐined 
sugar productions (34 percent and 38 
percent, respectively) in the United 
States and a humongous increase 
(480 percent) in imports of reϐined 
sugar (mostly sugar coming from EU 
white sugar). Raw sugar imports into 
the United States contract given the 
availability of inexpensive white sugar 
and the contraction of the US cane-
reϐining sector and sugar prices fall 
by 18 percent (raw) and 15 percent 
(reϐined). Beet and cane productions 
contract by 36 percent and 34 percent, 
respectively, with falling farm prices. 
Sugar prices remain above the loan rate 
levels for sugar. Food use of white sugar 
increases by 12 percent. Losses to US 
sugar crop producers and processors 
are substantial.
Conversely in the European Union, 
sugar production expands by 21 percent 
to export to the United States (an 
increase of 367 percent from a small 
base to 1,249 MT). EU beet output 
increases by four percent. Beets are 
also grown for ethanol, which explains 
the smaller relative increase in EU beet 
output relative to the EU white sugar 
expansion. The EU white sugar price 
increases by roughly four percent and 
white sugar consumption falls by a bit 
more than one percent.
The changes in the isoglucose/
HFCS markets are more convoluted. 
EU protection disappears, inducing 
a modest decrease in EU prices and 
a modest HFCS trade ϐlow from the 
United States to the European Union. 
In addition, powerful indirect effects 
occur in food processing. In the United 
States, cheaper sugar is substituted 
for HFCS, and in the European Union, 
cheaper HFCS is substituted for 
sugar. Consumption of the sweetener 
composite sugar-HFCS increases in 
the United States but falls slightly in 
the European Union, where isoglucose 
production increases because grain 
prices have fallen and margins have 
improved despite the loss of protection 
at the border. In the United States, 
production of HFCS falls because 
of the reduced use of HFCS in food 
processing, lower output prices, and 
deteriorating margins from higher corn 
prices. Production of gluten feed, the 
byproduct of HFCS/isoglucose follows 
the directions taken by HFCS/isoglucose 
in the two regions with a smaller effect 
in the European Union, given that 
other grains are used for isoglucose 
production. 
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